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Abstract
This paper presents the research on the interdisciplinary research infrastruc-
ture for understanding human reasoning in game-theoretic terms. Strategic
reasoning is considered to impact human decision making in social, econom-
ical and competitive interactions. The provided introduction explains and
connects concepts from AI, game theory and psychology. First result is a con-
cept of interdisciplinary game description language as a part of the focused
interdisciplinary research infrastructure. The need of this domain-specific
language is motivated and is aimed to accelerate the current developments.
As second result, the paper provides a summary of ongoing research and its
significance.
Keywords: behavioral game theory, interdisciplinary research
infrastructure, multi-agent systems, domain-specific languages, z-Tree,
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1. Introduction
There is more than one scientific discipline that can be used as a source
for predicting outcomes of human social, economical and competitive interac-
tions on the granularity level of individual decisions [1, p.4]. For autonomous
intelligent systems, which perceive, decide and act in an environment accord-
ing to their preferences, the notion agent can be used [2, chap.2]. In addition
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to computer science related disciplines (AI and MAS), this notion is also
used in sociology regarding people [3]. Further, people and artificial agents
are called as real agents in contrary to theoretical concepts.
Game theory is the appropriate mathematical discipline, if the agents’ in-
teractions can be considered as strategic [4]. In strategic interactions, agents
are rational and apply mutually and even recursively the concept rationality.
This concept justifies not only decisions, but also predictions of outcomes.
A rational agent makes always decisions, whose execution has according to
his subjective estimation the most preferred consequences for him [2, 4]. The
informative value and the correctness of the subjective estimation depend on
the level of agent’s intelligence.
A rational agent is not required originally to be familiar with the concept
“rational agent” appellative for him. A rational agent is a strategic agent [1,
p.109], if the case of familiarity with the nested and recursive application of
the concept “rational agent” is given. For strategic agents Alice and Bob e.g.,
nested rationality means that Alice predicts Bob’s prediction of her rational
decisions, if she knows his present preferences over the consequences of her
actions. Therefore, the strategic agents are a subset of the rational agents.
Strategic agents with unbounded intelligence satisfy the definition of game-
theoretic agents [5].
If interacting strategic agents identify each other as strategic agents, it is
called a strategic interaction. Further, game is a notion introduced by von
Neumann and Morgenstern [6] for the formal structure of a concrete strategic
interaction. Although the modern game-theoretic textbooks contain mostly
fictive scenarios, the reader is asked to resist the conclusion that real-life
cases can not be formalized as games. In contrast, early research on game
theory was forced by the RAND corporation in order to provide predictions
for the outcome of Cold War [7]. The fictiveness of game-theoretic examples
facilitates rather an objective and politically inoffensive scientific discussion.
And as conjectured, formalized rules of parlor games like chess are also games
in game-theoretic terms.
Agents involved in a game are called players. A game in normal form con-
sists of the strategies (sets of decisions) and players’ preferences over outcomes
[4]. Finite normal form games contain a finite number of outcomes. Solving
a game in game-theoretic terms means to provide the equilibria. Due to its
definition, an equilibrium is an irrevocable combination of players’ strategies
– none of the players can improve his outcome by altering his chosen strategy.
If players’ preferences are defined by their payoff functions, the equilibria of
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finite normal form games are guaranteed and called Nash equilibria [8]. A
payoff or also utility function assigns a numeric value as magnitude of pref-
erence to every outcome. Calculation of equilibria is generally NP-hard [9].
GAMBIT is a library of implemented algorithms for this task [10].
In the case of players, who are intelligent enough to solve their game, an
equilibrium should (immediately) occur independently of players’ builds or
even real identities. This is fundamentally different to the common AI ap-
proach, where programs compete the last decades in playing chess e.g. still
without achieving any irrevocable solution [2, chap.5]. The common AI ap-
proach is reasonable nevertheless. Although the existence of an equilibrium
is proven for chess, analytical abilities of none of the present game theorists
suffices to show at least, whether the equilibrium implicates the win of the
whites [11]. Therefore, an equilibrium is not guaranteed to occur, if at least
one of the players is not able to solve the game. The AI approach is refer-
enced further as game playing.
Formalization of a concrete strategic interaction as a game is not trivial, if
explicit rules lack contrary to such cases like chess. This step is mostly done
manually by the game theorists themselves, before a game can be solved.
(Manual) game-theoretic formalization is not guaranteed to be accurate and
mostly results in far too simplified “toy games” as criticized in AI literature
[12]. A strategic agent faces the same problem as a strict outsider like a
game theorist. He has to answer the question correctly, which interacting
(strategic) agents really exist in the environment and in what kind of game
he is involved in. It is called incomplete information in game-theoretic terms
[4], if this question can not be clarified.
In the case that a probability distribution over all possible game-theoretic
formalizations can be provided, incomplete information can be transformed
to imperfect information as proposed by Harsanyi [13]. For instance, poker
is a game of imperfect information, where every player is supposed to be
aware about the probability distribution over the possible hands, but does
not know the current hands. It is not obligatory that a game becomes a
common knowledge among its players – it is also possible that a player bears
his own variant of the game in mind, he misconceives to be involved in. As a
reminder, common knowledge is that, what everybody knows and everybody
knows that everybody knows it and prepending “everybody knows that” ad
infinitum [14].
Common knowledge of the game would not exist during a poker round, if
Alice hides cards in her sleeve unknown to her opponent Bob. Equilibria can
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be calculated for the original game as well as for the “cheated” game. Alice
considers that Bob’s actions should conform the equilibria calculated in the
original game, but does not act accordingly to the equilibria of the “cheated”
game – she rather calculates the equilibria of a global game consisting of the
original game and the “cheated” game [15]. Generally, players may have an
intractable number of mutual nested believes about the details of their game.
For instance, Alice could reckon to some extent that Bob also cheats, Bob
could suspect Alice of considering him as a cheater and so on. An intractable
number of mutual nested believes results in an intractable size of the global
game, where no game-theoretic solution is guaranteed to be calculated or
even to exist in the case of infinity. Further, there is no trivial general way
for direct control or prediction of the players’ mutual nested believes and
their development. Therefore, cases are concentrated on, where a game of
imperfect information is its players’ common knowledge.
This paper concentrates on the relevance of strategic reasoning in real
agents’ decision making, which causes an (immediately) occurring equilib-
rium, if the unbounded intelligence is assumed. In the cases of absent strate-
gic reasoning, game theory can still predict the direction of convergence id
est towards an equilibrium. This is proposed by Price [16] for prediction
of stochastic processes, more precisely populations in biological terms, and
is called evolutionary game theory [17]. A convergence is also observed in
the case of using reinforcement learning instead of strategic reasoning [18,
e.g.]. The assumption of this paper is that the usage of the concept strategic
reasoning can be extended by newer methods. This assumption does not
negate the existence of reinforcement learning e.g. in real agents’ strategic
interactions and is discussed next in the case of people.
Although the real human preferences are a subject of philosophical dis-
cussions [19], the application of strategic reasoning assumes that they can be
captured in concrete interactions as required for modeling rationality. The
consideration of people as rational agents is disputed at least in psychol-
ogy [20, pp.527–530], where even a scientifically accessible argumentation
exposes the existence of stable and consistent human preferences as a myth
[21]. Since the last six decades nevertheless, the common scientific standards
for econometric experiments are that subjects’ preferences over outcomes can
be insured by paying differing amounts of money [22, 23]. However, insuring
preferences by money is criticized by the term homo economicus as well [24].
The ability of identifying other agents and of modeling their reasoning
corresponds with the psychological term ToM (Theory of Mind) [25], which
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lacks almost only in the cases of autism. For application of strategic reason-
ing, subjects as well as researchers, who both are supposed to be non-autistic
people, may be then able of modeling of others’ strategic reasoning too. In
Wason task at least, subjects’ reasoning does not match the researchers’ one
though [26]. People may use no logic at all [27], but also mistake seriously
in the calculus of probabilities [28].
The data of econometric experiments does not match the equilibria of
games according to which they are conducted [29, 30]. That means that the
strategic reasoning according to the global (researchers’ point of view) game
does not arise among the subjects due to a set of reasons, which should be
clarified. There is a need for more than only the pure analytical game the-
ory, because even people familiar with game theory are observed to deviate
from equilibria in multiple cases [30]. It is gathering and analyzing of data
from experiments and field studies. This paper steps further – it proves the
potential of making the interdisciplinary research on real agents’ strategic
interactions more efficient. Like in bio-informatics [31], it is supposed to be
done by an interdisciplinary research infrastructure – domain specific lan-
guages and common tools.
The paper is organized as follow. Next section summarizes the main con-
cepts for the interdisciplinary research infrastructure. Then, the section 3
presents detailed the hitherto research. At the end, the results are concluded
in order to figure out the remaining construction sites.
2. Conceptualizing Interdisciplinary Research Infrastructure
A conceptualization of the already partially existing (interdisciplinary)
research infrastructure for real agents’ strategic interactions follows. It aims
to provide an elaborate overview and an exhaustive motivation. Artificial
agents are also included into consideration, although this paper concentrates
mostly on people. People can be replaced by artificial agents in order to
simulate or to intervene human strategic interactions. Whether simulation
or intervention – in both cases, artificial agents can cut costs, allow a direct
control of their builds, can be numerously deployed and are almost unlimited
in period of use.
In order to avoid incomplete information, which can make the application
of strategic reasoning intractable, an explicit formalization is to be used. Be-
cause a formalization of a concrete strategic interaction can be inaccurate, it
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is reasonable to execute it inversely. A concrete strategic interaction has to
be created out of an already existing game. This is game realization and a
software-based game realization is a game implementation [1, p.108]. Game
realization is the almost always unmentioned action after mechanism design
[2, p.632]. Mechanism design is inverse to game solving – adjusting of a game
to already predetermined desired equilibria. If game realization is impossible,
mechanism design is futile.
In real-life cases, games can be realized by physical conditions, by non-
participating agents, by participating agents themselves or by a subset of the
3 previous instances [32]. If participating agents are responsible for a (par-
tial) game realization, they should prefer the compliance with rules over the
advantages from “cheating”. A non-participating agent responsible for game
realization can be modeled as rational too. For instance, the attorney in
prisoner’s dilemma keeps his word in order to not risk his reputation, where
prisoner’s dilemma is supposed to be familiar to the reader.
In the case of game implementation, the software can be divided into frac-
tions: game management, game-solving algorithms, game-playing algorithms
and auxiliary algorithms. Game management is the part of software, which
executes the rules and calculates outcomes [33]. It may also record in order
to gather data [34]. Human-computer interfaces aka proxy agents [35] are
examples of auxiliary algorithms. Additionally, game implementation minus
game-solving/playing algorithms is called game infrastructure [1, p.53].
In the case of explicit rules, the question about the form of games arises.
The normal form is one of the two most general forms to express games
in non-co-operative game theory. In co-operative game theory or also coali-
tional game theory [36], players may covenant and group into coalitions. The
process of negotiating and the way of ensuring the agreements themselves
are not issues of co-operative game theory. From non-co-operative game-
theoretic point of view, disadvantages should arise for the players, who break
the agreements. From both points of view, a player makes a rational deci-
sion, whether it is his own behavior or an agreement about a co-operative
behavior. Both points of view are considered to be equal [4]. Due to the fact
that the pure analytical game theory does not suffice, the interest is focused a
more detailed form – the extensive form – the second most general to express
games in non-co-operative game theory. In contrast to others, the extensive
form captures separately the actions’ sequences and their alternating subse-
quences in a representation known as game tree in AI. Therefore, the actions’
sequences can be called as root paths. The normal form and the coalitional
6
formalization are skipped as argued because of their higher abstraction. Also
skipped is the consideration of continuous games [37], where equilibra can be
acquired by solving of differential equations and no general form exit.
The theoretical appropriateness of the extensive form does not result a
computational one – the problem is the inappropriate size of a games rep-
resented in extensive form. For instance, one can consider that the rules of
chess are sent as a game tree via network. It is rather an Interdisciplinary
Game Description Language (IGDL) having expressive power of the extensive
form, which is needed for 4 rough categories of considered instances within
and beyond game implementations. These categories are
Ы) game-solving algorithms,
Э) game-playing algorithms,
Ю) non-solving/playing algorithms (game manage-
ment, mechanism design, auxiliaries etc.) and
Я) scientific human users (sociologists e.g.).
Less important issues are skipped out of this consideration for IGDL – issues
like adjustments for evolutionary mechanism design [38] and for non-scientific
human users. Reducing the size compared with an equivalent representation
in extensive form is called further compactness [1, p.65]. Compactness is not
the only criterion for IGDL. For the categories Ы–Я, one can summarize the
partial criteria as following:
1. Computational speed-up. Regularities like symmetries can be used
in order to reduce the computation time of equilibria [39]. This feature
is captured by formalisms called succinct games and should be also
provided by IGDL. Reduction of computation time by using compact
representation applies also to game-playing algorithms [40, e.g.] and
can be considered in the case of game management.
2. Re-usability & comparability. A language for games forces the
re-usability and also comparability of game-playing algorithms as sug-
gested by Pell [41]. This applies also for game-solving algorithms [10]
and for non-solving/playing algorithms algorithms [42].
3. Interdisciplinary human usability. IGDL should prevent the scien-
tific manual game-theoretic formalization from resulting in “toy games”
as criticized in AI literature [12]. A graphical representation of a game
may improve the usability even more [43].
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4. Decidability. This feature should be provided for IGDL in order to
ensure that the calculation of outcomes definitely terminates [44]. This
also important for game-solving/playing algorithms to be able to cal-
culate the consequences of actions.
5. General compact interchange format. For interfacing instances of
the categories Ы–Я, IGDL should satisfy the need of a compact inter-
change format. At same time, IGDL should be as general as possible,
where the facility to express n-person games of imperfect information is
most general. Finally, instances of all the mentioned categories should
be at least theoretically IGDL-compatible in order to skip reformatting,
id est to facilitate their efficient mutual integration.
6. Time. Time remains the issue disregarded by the extensive form. As
one can conceive by comparing game playing in fast chess and in nor-
mal chess, time given for making decisions impacts them. Therefore,
time is needed to be included in IGDL in order to ascertain the time
dependent details by the explicit rules. Otherwise, the durations of ac-
tions’ sequences e.g. may depend on the current game implementation
and not be given explicitly in advance conjoined with the game.
Some examples for usage of IGDL can be provided. As 1st example, IGDL-
compatible chess playing algorithms can be incorporated into system, which
compete in playing other chess-like games described in IGDL. As 2nd exam-
ple, a IGDL-based game editor can be used to allow non-computer scientists
to set-up their own experiments. As 3rd example, data gathered in experi-
ments conducted according to a game described in IGDL can be compared
with the equilibria calculated by IGDL-based game-solving algorithms for
the same game. As 4th example, game described in IGDL can be easily
forwarded to the IGDL-based game-playing algorithms for an approximative
solution, if IGDL-based game-solving algorithms fail to output timely. As 5th
example (proposed by [45]), the data of the experiments conducted based on
IGDL can be better compared or even stored in a central web database like
the state of art in bio-informatics. Games described in a special language
with and without conjoined time dependent details are called further game
descriptions.
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Table 1: Overview of the precursors for IGDL [1, p.69]. Numbers in the Crit.-subrow are
the satisfied criteria from the section 2, The Used-subrow shows the categories of used
software. The Means-row includes the rough categories of the means used for describing
games. “perfect” concerning information is to be inferred in case of missing “imperfect”
and “simultaneous moves”.
Approach Crit. Means Class of games
Citation Used
congestion games 1,4 functions subset of n-person games,
[46] Ы,Ю simultaneous moves
sequential form 1,4 matrices 2-person games of
[12] Ы,Ю imperfect information
graph games 1,4 graphs, n-person games,
[47] Ы,Ю functions simultaneous moves
local effect games 1,4 functions subset of n-person games,
[48] Ы,Ю simultaneous moves
action graph games 1,4 graphs, n-person games,
[49] Ы,Ю functions simultaneous moves
Gala 2 logic n-person games of
[50] Ы imperfect information
MAID 1,4 Bayes-nets n-person games of
[51] Ы,Э imperfect information
continuous games 6 functions subset of 2-person games of
[52] Ы imperfect information
timed games 6 functions 2-person games
[53, 54] Э
GDL 1,2,4 logic deterministic n-person games,
[44] Э,Ю simultaneous moves
GDL-II 1,2,4,5 logic n-person games of
[55] Э,Ю imperfect information
game Petri-nets 1 Petri-nets deterministic n-person games,
[56] Ы simultaneous moves
PNSI 2,4–6 Petri-nets n-person games of
[57] Ы–Ю imperfect information
SIDL2.0 2,5,6 logic n-person games of
[1, p.98] Ю imperfect information
z-Tree-language 2,3,5,6 imperative n-person games of
[42] Ю,Я language imperfect information
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3. Summarizing Ongoing Research
IGDL is the desired domain-specific language, which has already some
precursors and these precursors are summarized in this section. It is also
possible that the ongoing research will bear different concurrent versions of
IGDL. In order to assess the hitherto approaches better, a rough categoriza-
tion of the used formal means is provided. Such categories are functions,
graphs, logic, Petri-nets and so on. Tab.1 contains the regarded approaches
and their rough categories. The ability to describe simultaneous moves (id
est actions) is subset to more general imperfect information, because other
players’ actions can be unobserved only during a simultaneous execution. In
deterministic games, it is impossible to describe a probability distribution
over possible subsequences of actions.
In discrete non-co-operative game theory, there are different approaches
for compact game forms, whose aim is computational speed-up [39]. The
most important of them chronologically ordered are congestion games [46],
sequential form [12], graph games [47], local effect games [48] and action graph
games [49]. The software GAMUT can generate random games of these and
other kinds, where the extensive form is included [58]. Computational speed-
up of sequential form in solving 2-person-games of imperfect information is
used in GAMBIT [10].
GAme LAnguage (Gala) [50] is developed in order to provide an interface
to the game-solving algorithms. Factually, Gala affords Prolog-based game
descriptions, where a game of extensive form or of normal form can be gen-
erated. The generated game-theoretic representation can be forwarded to
GAMBIT or other game-solving algorithms. The main improvement of Gala
compared to these representations is the game descriptions’ compactness as
perceived at least at the examples from Gala’s software package. Due to full-
scale Prolog, Gala does not provide decidability. Therefore, the generation
of extensive form games from Gala game descriptions must not terminate.
There is a subset of game-playing algorithms, which is not only aimed
to play games, but also to simulate human (strategic) reasoning in them.
Simulating human reasoning falls in the subject of cognitive science. There
are currently two different approaches, where the human strategic reasoning
has to be expressed in a general language in order to facilitate an efficient
comparability of the models. The first is based on cognitive architectures
[59, 60], which are languages for models of general human reasoning. The
second is based onMulti-Agent Influence Diagrams (MAID) [51]. The second
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factually conforms the game-theoretic point of view on strategic interactions
and provides the alternative language MAID for describing games. MAID
are shown to be expressive enough to represent n-person games of imperfect
information in the algorithms for game playing. MAID can be also trans-
formed to extensive form in order to solve them [61].
The previously discussed literature does not mention the inclusion of time
dependent details in game descriptions, what some theoretical approaches
from game theory, concurrency theory [62] and control engineering [54] aim.
A current work [52] in game theory extends extensive form games of perfect
information and continuous time [63] to such of imperfect information – con-
tinuous games. In [63, 52], only a subset of such games is regarded – the set
of player’s actions is always the same. Generally, a point of time is assigned
to every action and time grows strictly over a sequence of actions.
Game Description Language (GDL) successed in sparking an international
programing competition on general game playing [44, 64]. A concrete game
description in GDL is sent to an artificial game player and never to its hu-
man programmer – the programmer knows only the structure of GDL. This
satisfies the criterion 2. For the criterion 5, generality of IGDL’s precursors
is a trend – either it will be possible to describe n-person games of imperfect
information in IGDL or IGDL should be extended to facilitate that. This
trend caused the development of GDL-II [55], which is an extension of GDL
for n-person games of imperfect information. Like GDL, GDL-II is based on
Datalog, which is a version of Prolog [65]. Datalog guarantees decidability by
banning functions, limiting variables’ ranges and restricting recursion. Due
to the decidability, the existing game management algorithm based on GDL-
II is guaranteed to terminate. However, the ban of functions worsen com-
pactness. For instance, if arithmetic addition is needed to describe actions’
consequences in a game, the result for every required summands’ combina-
tion must be separately defined in the game description.
There are no time dependent details included explicitly in GDL-II game
descriptions. GDL and GDL-II describe games in a way STRIPS-like [66]
languages do. In languages for planning tasks, STRIPS-like descriptions can
be replaced by descriptions based on Petri nets [67]. Petri Nets for Strategic
Interaction (PNSI) is a game description language, which is proposed chrono-
logically between GDL and GDL-II [43]. PNSI uses basic Petri nets instead
of logic. Petri nets are also known being used in game theory to describe sub-
classes of games [56]. PNSI provides decidability [1, p.89]. The advantages
of PNSI compared with GDL-II are the graphical representation of Petri
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nets and the ability to describe games of equidistant time. Equidistant time
means that the game management algorithm for PNSI pauses exactly for one
chronon between two game states [57], where a game state is also a node of
its game tree. In this context, a chronon is a constant period of time, which
is explicitly known to players. During a chronon, players’ actions can be sub-
mitted. The game management algorithm for GDL-II is not of equidistant
time, because the next state is calculated exactly after the submission of the
last action, if it is inside the allowed time period. The time point of the last
submission may vary depending on players. Of cause, GDL-II is supposed
be also able to describe games of equidistant time, if its game management
algorithm is modified as proposed for PNSI.
For PNSI, there exist an algorithm that can generate games of exten-
sive form from game descriptions as in the case of Gala [57]. Therefore,
PNSI provides an interface to game solving algorithms. A game of extensive
form generated based on a PNSI game description is a slightly modified state
transition system of the underlying basic Petri net. In this context, a state
transition system is an oriented graph consisting of game states, where every
edge represents a progression in time. There is still no algorithm for GDL-II
to generate games of extensive form. A state transition system can be also
generated for GDL-II game descriptions [55]. Therefore, generation of exten-
sive form games is supposed to be also possible for GDL-II game description.
PNSI suffers of insufficient compactness as well as GDL-II but in a dif-
ferent way. The arithmetic addition and subtraction are banned in Datalog,
but inherently supported by basic Petri nets. On the other hand, basic Petri
nets require every state to be decoded as a vector of natural numbers and do
not have other operations than the addition and the subtraction. The game
description of the parlor game Nim needs in PNSI much less space than in
GDL-II [1]. The opposite for chess, a GDL-II chess description needs less.
Dropping the criterion of decidability may dramatically improve com-
pactness. Strategic Interaction Definition Language (SIDL) is based on ISO-
Prolog, does not provide decidability and attains for example games a higher
compactness [1, p.98]. Of cause, the widely used game description in an im-
perative language can be also mentioned. However, the game management
part of software aka game server is then required to send its own code in
order to provide explicit rules [1, p.54].
For scientific human users beyond computer science, there is an ongoing
development of user-friendly software for experiments [68]. RatImage [69]
and TEEC [68] are examples of the first generation of such software. They
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are libraries, which facilitate programming. The second generation provides
already domain-specific languages for the game management and the layout
of human-computer interfaces. These are ComLabGames [70] and z-Tree [42].
z-Tree is the most used [45]. There is a z-Tree-language, which is actually
an imperative language, in which the game and also the human-computer
interfaces can be described. This language does not provide decidability. It
has no relations to game solving or playing algorithms.
4. Conclusion
A large-scale view on the problem of understanding human strategic rea-
soning is presented. The elaborated solution is the development of the inter-
disciplinary research infrastructure. This research infrastructure is proposed
to make the interdisciplinary research more efficient, as it is already observed
in similar interdisciplinary problems. As an underline of the large-scale view,
there are matters chained from different sources, which have been never cited
together before. For instance, GDL-II and z-Tree are such matters.
The elaborated concept is the domain-specific language IGDL. A sum-
mary of its precursors shows that none of these is developed enough to sat-
isfy IGDL’s full outline. There is still no language, which incorporates the
graphical representation like PNSI, compactness improvements like GDL-II
and a proven human usability like z-Tree-language.
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